The environmental sustainability of economic growth has been subject to much debate for many decades. Recently, two alternatives to the growth paradigm have been put forward: namely, "a-growth" and "degrowth." The first proposes to ignore GDP information and focus instead on sound environmental, social, and economic policies independently of their effects on economic growth. The second recommends a downscaling of the economy so as to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries. We compare these approaches in the context of the growth paradigm and examine whether they have any merit. We further consider the potential contribution of institutional economics to further develop such alternatives.
The first way of contributing begins with recognizing that the GDP indicator, rather than GDP growth, is the problem, and that we should ignore it in public debate on policy and welfare. By implication, one has to be "agnostic" about, or indifferent to, economic growth, which has been referred to as an "a-growth" perspective.
The motivation for this approach is that the GDP indicator cannot be trusted to effectively capture social welfare. This is so for several reasons (van den Bergh 2009). First, GDP is really an estimate of the costs, not the benefits, of market-related activities in society, while it entirely excludes informal or non-market activities. Second, economic theory always focuses on social welfare as societal goal, and it does not offer any support for GDP as a measure of social welfare. Indeed, it has been shown that GDP is only a good approximation of social welfare under very strict, unrealistic conditions (Weitzman 1976) . Third, according to some happiness or
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911 subjective well-being studies, between 1950 and 1980 the increase in mean welfare stagnated and even reversed into a negative trend in most economically advanced countries, despite a steady pace of GDP growth (Layard 2005) . Fourth, a multitude of factors influence individual welfare or happiness. Alongside the need for basic goods and services, these include relatively stable income, social status advancement, and effective adaptation to physical and economic changes. As a result, it is unlikely that the aggregation of individual incomes, represented by GDP, will deliver a robust indicator of social welfare. Fifth, an important subcategory of unpriced effects of growth relates to the use of natural resources and the environment, meaning that its welfare implications are not captured by GDP.
If one accepts that (per capita) GDP is not a robust, reliable indicator of social progress, then the logical implication is to ignore it. This means that one is completely indifferent to GDP growth, or one supports an "a-growth" position. GDP growth may be good in some periods, for some countries, in certain development stages, but the goal of "growth no matter what" is not a wise strategy. In fact, unconditional GDP growth means a constraint on our search for progress: It frustrates good policies in many areas, including climate, labor, health, and public utilities. Some have termed this trend the "neoliberal ideology/tyranny of growth" (Fournier 2008 ) and "GDP fetishism" (Stiglitz 2009 ). According to the a-growth view, we should not fall into the trap of being unconditionally pro-or anti-growth.
A-growth, consistent with ignoring GDP information, will make two policy strategies regarding currently important problems more acceptable. The first policy entails a large-scale transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources in response to peak oil-and climate change risks. Such a transition will involve a shift to resources with a lower energy concentration and productivity, which inevitably translates into a reduced productivity of the economy as a whole. Indeed, current growth is largely generated by relatively dirty activities, which use much energy and material resources, as well as create a disproportional amount of pollution (Hueting 2010) . Within the traditional growth paradigm, realizing environment and resource sustainability is, therefore, extremely difficult as it means sacrificing productivity, and thus growth. In other words, the growth paradigm presents an enormous barrier to introducing necessary environmental policies, hence, to making a "sustainability transition." An agrowth position removes this barrier, because environmental regulation is no longer constrained by unconditional growth. The a-growth view is that, since growth in rich nations hardly contributes to welfare, implementing stringent environmental policies will not do much harm to welfare.
Another policy implication relates to the current global economic crisis. A major concern here is the high rate of unemployment. One may see it as a challenge to studying how to realize full employment in an "a-growth economy"-that is, an economy which is not necessarily, or always, growing. As with the previous example, sacrificing some productivity -thus growth -may be necessary to realize other goals, notably increasing employment (Jackson and Victor 2011 ). Yet, both governments and economists hardly ever consider this strategy. Instead, their response has consistently been prioritizing growth restoration in the hope that an increase in employment will follow automatically. The lack of creativity in this context is disappointing and does not characterize an open scientific approach to the problem.
A-growth, or letting go of growth as a legitimate and even necessary condition for realizing welfare (growth), reflects a rational approach to public decision-making. It does not mean being in favor of zero-or negative growth. It just eliminates the unnecessary constraint of unconditional GDP growth, which hampers our search for human progress. Following an a-growth strategy, we would, in some periods, be willing -without even realizing it -to give up some GDP growth for a better environment, more employment, more leisure time, and improved public services; that is, when this approach yields improvements in individual well-being and overall social progress. In other periods, desirable economic change might well be consistent with growth, but nobody should really care. The most important thing is that an agrowth view could enhance the social-political acceptability of such key public policies that matter for welfare.
Degrowth
Degrowth is another recent notion. It has been defined as an equitable downscaling of economic production and consumption to assure that society's throughput -resource use and waste -stays within safe ecosystem boundaries (Kallis 2011; Schneider et al. 2010) . Degrowth moves beyond the criticism of GDP, to ask explicitly for an intentional downscaling of economic activity and material affluence. The premise is that efficiency and technological improvements alone cannot prevent climate change, ecosystem destruction, and resource depletion. The scale of the economy may have to shrink, too. In three hundred years of industrialization, there has been a strong correlation between growth and forms of environmental damage, including most recently through energy over-use and CO 2 emissions. Countries that reduced their material flows and CO 2 emissions have done so either because of economic decline (i.e., the ex-communist bloc in Europe), or through relocation to other countries of their consumer goods production (Peters et al. 2011 ). Recession and negative growth in some western countries following the latest economic crisis led, for the first time, to an absolute decline in CO 2 emissions (Friedlingstein et al. 2010 ). However, negative growth is socially unstable and potentially catastrophic (Jackson 2009 ). As an alternative, degrowth proponents argue for a "prosperous way down" (Odum and Odum 2001) -that is, a "socially sustainable economic degrowth" (Martinez-Alier 2009). This involves implementing social policies that will contribute to a smooth and stable economic downscaling.
To do so, one proposal is to introduce global caps on key resources such as oil and CO 2 emissions that are shared equitably between nations on a per capita basis ("cap and share," Douthwaite 2011), and are declining over time. In addition, degrowth proponents put forward three more propositions in order to respond to the negative effects of economic contraction on employment and social stability: namely, work-sharing, strengthened social-security system, and alternative economic spaces existing outside the market economy (Latouche 2009). Work-sharing refers to reduced working hours, allowing more people to be employed, and to creating jobs with low economic productivity but high social value. Examples of such are healthcare services, education, and small scale, local businesses (Jackson 2009) . A strengthened social safety net to buffer any negative effects of remaining unemployment includes a scheme for basic income, guaranteed by the state to all citizens (Raventös 2007) , and a job-providing system, with the state acting as the employer of last resort in periods of crisis (Lawn 2009). Obviously, both work-sharing and social security will require a more drastic redistribution of income than currently is the case. This means a significant increase in taxes for those with higher incomes to levels that were common in many countries -including in the U.S. -in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, a shift of taxation from labor to energy, materials, and capital will be needed (de Mooij 1999; Korten 2009 ).
Furthermore, the link between well-being and access to wage labor in the formal economy can be weakened by improved access to non-monetized goods and services. There are various social innovations in this domain, including urban food gardens for own consumption, time-banks where participants exchange services on the basis of their labor time, and co-housing projects where participants co-invest "sweat-equity" in house rehabilitation (Carlsson 2008; NEF 2009 ). Such practices are driven by the logic of producing social "use value" rather than monetary "exchange value." Although currently marginal, alternative economic practices grow under crisis conditions as local communities lose access to formal labor and credit markets and self-organize in mutual support networks to survive. Of course, none of the above alternatives negates the importance of job creation by private firms and governments. Table 1 compares a-growth and degrowth with conventional views on growth, the "growth paradigm." The a-growth strategy proposes to be agnostic of what will happen to the economy once good environmental and social policies are pursued. It is consistent with the belief that stringent environmental and climate policies are likely to depress growth, at least for a while, since much of growth (before the crisis) was generated in relatively "dirty sectors," whereas "cleaner sectors" are generally lowgrowth (Jackson and Victor 2011) . The degrowth strategy turns the causality around by insisting that the economy must be downscaled to meet environmental and social goals. One question about the relative merits of the two options concerns the power of environmental regulation. The degrowth proposal refers to the historically high correlation between GDP and indicators of pollution and resource use. But one could respond that this -at least, in part -is due to the absence of serious environmental regulation in the past. Thus, the past may not reflect the future, in which we manage to implement good policies.
A Comparison of Growth, A-Growth, and Degrowth
Should degrowth be the way to go -notably, reaching a safe level of CO 2 emissions, given that we need to reduce these by at least 95 percent by 2050; and possibly to 99- (Jackson 2009 , chapter 5, figure 17) or even one hundred percent (Matthews and Caldeira 2008) -then, degrowth would have to "downscale" the economy by a factor of 20 to 100. This suggests that actually implementing environmentally effective degrowth may not be so romantic and innocent. One should, however, realize that it may be equally unrealistic to expect that such an ambitious goal is realizable with positive growth: that is, with pro-growth strategies, complemented by decoupling growth and environmental pressure (and thus maintaining growth), through substitution in production and consumption, and application of more efficient, innovative technologies. This pessimistic conclusion is confirmed by the literature on environmental Kuznets curves, showing that decoupling does not hold in general, and, in fact, only applies to relatively easy problems, mainly associated with human health (Stern 2004) . Tim Jackson (2009) has argued that "the numbers do not add up," and unless we succeed in completely decarbonizing the economy through technology, some level of degrowth is unavoidable. An environmental policy approach, which is consistent with an a-growth perspective and does not put degrowth first, is capable of arranging a balanced solution to the environmental goals in terms of substitution, as well as technological and scale effects. As already stated, degrowth -notably, in very dirty sectors, where substitution and new technology cannot realize the environmental goals -may be an outcome of this policy approach, but not the starting point. One could, of course, propose to combine an explicit degrowth strategy with such an environmental policy strategy. But then the question arises: If policy already will stimulate a degree of necessary or unavoidable degrowth, why would then any ex ante choices and extra effort for degrowth also be needed?
From a degrowth perspective, the answer is that an explicit commitment to downscaling the economy can help to remove the main obstacle to the environmental policies: namely, their negative impact on growth (or, in everyday terms, that in times of economic recession, the "environment has to wait"). In this sense, the a-growth and degrowth strategies come closer together, both aiming to remove the growth paradigmatic resistance against policies that are good for the environment, society, and human well-being. They differ, however, in that the degrowth view suggests that only a society consciously embracing the objective of downscaling its production and consumption is capable of accepting stringent environmental policies (Kallis 2011) .
In conclusion, one of us is more optimistic about being able to implement serious, effective environmental regulation before realizing an intentional, voluntary downscaling of this magnitude (van den Bergh 2011). This does not mean that he denies degrowth as a likely outcome of regulation, at least during some initial period. The other is more confident that a certain level of degrowth is unavoidable in any sustainable future scenario, and believes that it should even be set as a goal. Rather than avoiding calling things by their name, and becoming tactically agnostic, he prefers to give a name, "degrowth", to the direction to which such policies will, and should, be leading us (Kallis 2011) .
The belief that degrowth is needed to solve environmental problems somehow ignores that one cannot predict the changes of composition and volume at various levels in the economy -including production inputs, sector structure, technology, and consumption -that will result from implementing stringent environmental or climate policies. The problem is that with so many degrowth scenarios to "downscale" the economy, one cannot imagine how these will realize environmental goals to the same degree. The question is then: How can we know ex ante the environmental and social implications of these degrowth scenarios? Or which of them should we opt for, presuming we have a choice? This is precisely why advocates of degrowth often use the term "sustainable degrowth" (Kallis 2011; Martinez-Alier et al. 2010 ) to refer to this subset of possible scenarios that have positive social and ecological effects. The research question from this perspective becomes the identification of the conditions and instruments (like pollution caps and reduced work hours), under which the inevitable and desirable economic degrowth becomes socially and ecologically sustainable (Kallis 2011) .
Another criticism to the degrowth argument is that there is no single, consistent unit to measure the scale of the economy, so that the meaning of the notion is unclear. It might mean degrowth of consumption, work-hours, GDP, GDP per capita, or some measure of the physical size of the economy. Indeed, one finds authors on degrowth shifting between these different meanings that are often, but not always, mutually consistent (van den Bergh 2011). Degrowth proponents, in turn, argue that this lack of precision is not necessarily a drawback. First, degrowth should offer a vision for creating a better world, wherein people live with less. Although the details of operationalizing this vision, such as the indicators which will measure progress towards it, are yet to be developed, this is no reason for one to refrain from accepting the vision as such. Second, the degrowth vision is multi-dimensional and includes a combination of physical degrowth and decommodification on the production and consumption side. Third, apart from offering a vision, the call for degrowth intends to act as a challenge to the dominant ideology of growth and continuous expansion of the market economy. Simply ignoring this is not enough. Degrowth advocates argue that it is important to demonstrate that there are concrete alternatives; namely, that it is, in principle, possible to organize economies in such a way that they do not have to grow or "die," this already being the status quo.
While the a-growth position suggests that the prominence of the GDP indicator creates a barrier to good policies, from a degrowth perspective, the core problem is the systemic dependency of stable economies on an ever-expanding output. Thus, there is the need to imagine alternative forms of economic organization and to pursue policies for their realization. Interestingly, the two viewpoints converge on suggestions for key policies, including global caps and work-sharing.
Both a-growth and degrowth strategies are likely to be received as extreme within the current political setting, where recovery of growth is the unquestioned, priority response to the economic crisis -an approach, also endorsed by non-mainstream voices, focusing on Keynesian or austerity policies to recover growth. For example, work-sharing does not receive any attention, even though it can much more effectively relieve unemployment in the short-to-medium term. In particular, work-sharing can offer opportunities for young people to attain the necessary experience for a long-term integration in the labor market. Instead, growth will take at least ten to fifteen years to solve the extreme unemployment in Spain, for example, where 25 percent of the total work force and 50 percent of the young people are currently employed.
A-growth is, nevertheless, more likely to get support as there is increasing recognition among politicians and economists of the shortcomings of the GDP indicator (Stiglitz 2009 ). Degrowth, on the other hand, may galvanize the radical rearguard that is convinced that the ecological and economic crises have systemic roots, and that it is time for major institutional and life-style changes rather than mere reforms (Speth 2009 ). Perhaps the degrowth perspective can exert pressure through social movements which, in turn, might lead to the adoption of a-growth approaches at the political level.
Further Research and the Role of Institutional Economics
Ongoing research in institutional economics, like on alternatives to GDP, is obviously very relevant to the above debates (Brinkman and Brinkman 2011) . The debate on a-growth versus degrowth, however, poses some interesting questions to institutional economists. From an a-growth perspective, a crucial question becomes: Why economics, economists, and politicians alike remain loyal to GDP? Indeed, the arguments against using GDP as a progress indicator have been often repeated and are supported by influential economists, including many Nobel Prize laureates. This has been labeled the "GDP paradox" (van den Bergh 2009). Research in this domain might assess the intertwined institutional, educational, media, and cultural processes that have locked-in GDP as the preferred macroeconomic policy objective (despite GDP not playing any significant role in macroeconomic theory, where the goal is always framed in terms of a social welfare notion). In addition, institutional economics could investigate how GDP growth is exactly perceived in different schools of macroeconomics which, in turn, support different perspectives on how to combat the current crisis.
The "a-growth perspective" sees unconditional GDP (per capita) growth as an annoying and limiting constraint instead of as a useful societal goal. The perspective in question proposes to remove this constraint from the public sphere and politics. This will allow for more freedom for such public policies as combating unemployment (work sharing, even though it may lower average productivity and income), as well as environmental damage (stringent climate policy, even though it may harm some high-growth sectors). As a result, we would be more relaxed about growth and not get paralyzed by fear (as individuals and as a society) when growth turns low or negative. In fact, we should prefer not to know about this: that is, ignore GDP. This would preclude economic instability while allowing us to focus on real welfare-improving politics.
From a degrowth perspective, the interest is not so much on GDP, but on the evolution of alternative economic practices that can flourish outside of the growth economy. Such "Nowtopias" of cohousing projects, or consumer-producer cooperatives (Carlsson 2008) , are institutionally organized and result from a coevolution of social, technological, cultural, and ecological processes. There is a scope for studying their institutional dynamics, as well as for understanding how core institutions of the market economy pose obstacles to the emergence of such alternatives.
This suggests a need to apply insights of institutional economics -on the ways institutions work, change, and become locked-in along path-dependent trajectoriesto the history of GDP growth as a policy goal, in economics, politics, and society at large, as well as to the evolution of alternative economic practices. The debate about the merits and the feasibility of alternatives to GDP and the growth paradigm, and the actual design of such alternatives, might benefit a lot from the insights and approaches of institutional economics.
